The Model Conference
Global Security Issues
Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava

Modelová konferencia
Bezpečnostná sekcia
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Dear Forum for the 21st Century, dear partners from the Security Section,

first of all, let me thank you on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for your kind invitation to take part in the upcoming conference which provides a unique forum for discussion and cooperation on defence and security issues that all of us have to face nowadays. We feel particularly pleased with the timing of the conference, because as you may be well informed, the new Alliance's strategy is under discussion and a new Strategic Concept will be published at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 to reflect new and emerging security threats, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which as the reference document is crucial for developing the role and the approach of the Alliance in the next decade.
Please find some additional thoughts on the first draft attached below.

In the section Notes:

▪ **A changed international environment.** The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) enters the second decade of the twenty-first century as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world. NATO's role in maintaining the unity, security and freedom of the Euro-Atlantic region is ongoing. The democratic principles that initially brought it together remain valid. Its status as the globe's most successful political-military Alliance is unchallenged. Yet NATO's past accomplishments provide no guarantee for the future. It will be tested by the emergence of new dangers, the many-sided demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organising itself efficiently and responding rapidly in the next decades.
The development of a new Strategic Concept provides an opportunity to introduce NATO to populations who know little about it and who may be sceptical about the organisation's relevance to their lives. Although NATO is busier than it has ever been, its value is less obvious to many than in the past.
NATO needs a new Strategic Concept because the world has changed significantly since 1999, when the current concept was adopted. Most dramatically, the 9/11 and subsequent attacks, further, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is under increasing stress; incidents of instability along Europe's periphery have revived historic tensions; innovative modes of gathering, sending and storing information have brought with them new vulnerabilities; the security implications of piracy, energy supply risks and environmental neglect have become more evident; and a worldwide economic crisis has spawned widespread budgetary concerns. Meanwhile, the Alliance has grown to twenty-eight, enlarging both NATO's capabilities and its commitments.
▪ **Global Trends.** Between now and 2020, the international security environment will change in ways both predictable and unforeseen. Certainly, the forces that come under the general heading of globalization can be counted upon to intensify. This will result in a rapid, if uneven, growth in cross-border flows of goods, services, people, technology, ideas, customs, crime, and weapons. This deepening interdependence will bring the world ever closer but not necessarily make populations more inclined to live in peace. The turn of the century brought with it new and varied challenges for the Alliance. In earlier decades, NATO's defence preparations emphasised the massing of troops to deter or repel a cross-border attack. Today, Alliance members remain concerned about the possibility that regional disputes or efforts at political intimidation could undermine security along its borders. The most probable threats to Allies in the coming decade are unconventional. Three in particular stand out: 1) an attack by ballistic missile (whether or not nuclear-armed); 2) strikes by international terrorist groups; and 3) cyber assaults of varying degrees of severity. A host of other threats also pose a risk, including disruptions to energy and maritime supply lines, the harmful consequences of global climate change, and financial crisis. The danger posed by unconventional threats has obvious implications for NATO preparedness, including its definition of security, its conception of what constitutes an Article 5 attack, its strategy for deterrence, its need for military transformation, its ability to make decisions rapidly, and its reliance for help on countries and organisations from outside the Alliance. Because of its visibility and power, NATO may well be called upon to respond also to challenges that do not directly affect its security but that still matter to its citizens and that will contribute to the Alliance's international standing. These challenges could include the humanitarian consequences of a failed state, the devastation caused by a natural disaster, or the dangers posed by genocide or other massive violations of human rights. Less predictable is the possibility that research breakthroughs will transform the technological battlefield. Allies and partners should be alert for potentially disruptive developments in such dynamic areas as information and communications technology, cognitive and biological sciences, robotics, and nanotechnology.
▪ **Participating in a Comprehensive Approach to Complex Problems.** Healthy partnerships provide an opening for NATO to pursue solutions to complex problems that affect its security; in most instances, the preferred method will be a comprehensive approach that combines military and civilian elements. NATO is strong and versatile but it is by no means well-suited to every task. Other organisations, national governments and nongovernmental entities can lead the way toward such vital goals as economic reconstruction, political reconciliation, improved governance, and the strengthening of civil society. Depending on the needs in any particular case, NATO may serve as the principal organiser of a collaborative effort, or as a source of specialized assistance, or in some other complementary role. NATO is a regional, not a global organisation; its authority and resources are limited and it has no desire to take on missions that other institutions and countries can handle successfully. Already, NATO has responded to this new reality by assisting the government of Afghanistan in its fight against violent extremism, combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden, contributing to seaborne security in the Mediterranean, training and equipping Iraqi defence forces, and helping to construct more stable societies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. As this list indicates, shifting defence imperatives bring with them new needs -- for a transformation in military capabilities, a more sophisticated approach to NATO partnerships, more extensive security consultations, and a more streamlined and efficient Alliance structure.
▪ **Private military companies.** Speaking about the new security environment, the draft has drawn up a problem of privatization, so-called privatization of security and the emergence of new non-state actors, be it the bottom up or top down process. First about the use of what is called private military companies. According to the statement of the Secretary General[i], basically the Alliance believes that NATO operations should be conducted by what might be called official military units led by their responsible governments. Having stated that, it does not exclude the possibility that private security companies as such can be used for specific security tasks, protection of facilities, protection of people in certain areas. NATO would not completely exclude the possibility of using private companies, but of course, we have to strike the right balance and basically our military operations should be conducted by our military.
▪ **WMD.** The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, emphasize the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes, international arms control and disarmament agreements, reduce further the prominence of nuclear arms in the defence doctrines of any country, and to ensure that nuclear materials are handled in a safe and secure manner. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential tools in preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of these weapons and their delivery systems. NATO Allies have made substantial

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reductions in both the size and diversity of their nuclear capabilities. According to the analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces, with widely shared responsibility for deployment and operational support, at the minimum level required by the prevailing security environment. Any change in this policy, including in the geographic distribution of NATO nuclear deployments in Europe, should be made, as with other major decisions, by the Alliance as a whole. No NATO member country has a chemical or biological weapons programme. Additionally, Allies are committed to destroy any stockpiles of chemical agents and have supported a number of Partner countries in such activity. Broad participation of the non-nuclear Allies is also an essential sign of transatlantic solidarity and risk sharing and on the other hand, NATO endorses a policy of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. NATO should invite an ongoing dialogue with Russia on nuclear perceptions, concepts, doctrines, and transparency, and should convene a Special Consultative Group in order to inform and coordinate its internal dialogue about nuclear-related issues.

In the section Proposes:

- **Partnership with the UN.** NATO's partnership with the UN is also a central one due to the role played by that body within the world system and by the Allies' pledge of faith (invoked in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty) "in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." The Security Council's mandate – to safeguard international security and peace -- meshes well with the commitment of NATO members to "unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security." It is clearly in NATO's interests to support the UN and to help strengthen its capacity to perform the many missions assigned to it by the global community.

NATO and the UN have worked together in a number of conflict zones, with the Alliance providing operational support and security so that the UN can move
ahead on reconstruction, development, and governance-building. Although the partnership dates back more than a decade -- and while NATO and the UN signed a framework agreement in 2008 which has improved practical cooperation in some cases -- problems remain.

In a world of global threats, security depends increasingly on a rule-based international order. NATO will as one of its priorities, therefore, try to strengthen
the ability of the United Nations to fulfil its responsibilities. When NATO and the UN are both operating in an area, the Alliance should do its best, if requested, to provide security for UN civilian personnel. Without a minimum level of security, the UN (and other NATO partners) will be unable to operate and on the other hand without partners, NATO is often unable to meet its objectives. NATO and the UN should also improve their institutional links. A NATO liaison office at the UN would allow Alliance leaders to engage more easily with the Secretariat and with UN members. Additional forms of cooperation should be explored including participation in each other's training and exercise activities. Coordination between the UN and NATO can prove crucial in the event of genocide, other massive violations of human rights, or humanitarian emergency. The Strategic Concept should make clear that NATO is willing to consider requests from the UN to take appropriate action in such circumstances (possibly in support of other regional organisations), provided the NAC agrees to the mission and resources are available to carry it out.

- **Military Transformation and Reform.** NATO's military and political commitments will mean little unless matched by capabilities. The Strategic Concept should include a clear statement of defence priorities and be accompanied by an agreed set of essential new or improved capabilities and reforms. NATO forces must have the capacity to defend Alliance territory, undertake demandingmissions at strategic distance, contribute to a more secure international environment, and respond to unpredictable contingencies when and where that is required. Thus, there is a continuing need to transform NATO forces from the powerful but static posture of the Cold War into a posture that is more flexible, mobile, and versatile.

NATO's overriding purpose, set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, is "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation" of its members. The treaty signatories proposed to achieve this objective by uniting "their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security." These actions have always required that the Alliance perform certain core tasks the nature of which has evolved in keeping with alterations in the international security landscape. In the past two decades, as threats to the Euro-Atlantic region have grown more mobile and diverse, NATO has assumed new and broader missions that could hardly have been foreseen in 1949. However, these missions are fully consistent with the original objective of safeguarding the freedom of Alliance members. It is vital that Allies agree on what their core tasks are and on the need to maintain the capabilities required to fulfil them. NATO today is more active than at any previous time, yet its role in providing security is less obvious to many than it was during the Cold War. The new Strategic Concept offers an opportunity for reconciling differences of perspective and for dealing with novel situations. To this end, a fresh iteration of the core tasks of the Alliance is a necessary first step.

NATO operates as an important pillar of Euro-Atlantic security. In so doing, it functions neither in isolation from other organisations nor as a dominating force. The new Strategic Concept must identify NATO's appropriate role as a defender of its own interests and as a contributor to peace in every part of the region. The Alliance's close cooperation in the Balkans with the EU, the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a prime example of how NATO can collaborate with other institutions in order to advance the wellbeing of people throughout the continent. A number of elements come together in the performance of this core task, including NATO's partnerships with countries and organisations, and its support for – and adherence to -- the principles that provide a framework for how governments in the region should act toward one another and toward their own citizens. These principles, which can be traced back to the Helsinki Accords (1975), find their present form in the Charter for European Security signed in Istanbul (1999). NATO also contributes to stability through its open door policy, which has provided important incentives within Europe for democracy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for human rights. In addition, NATO's diplomatic efforts with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and the other countries of the Caucasus, and other nonmember states show that nations do not have to be part of the Alliance to join with NATO on projects that benefit all. For the Alliance of the 1960's, defence and détente were two sides of the same coin. For NATO of the new decade, the twin imperative is assured security for all its members and dynamic engagement beyond the treaty area to minimize threats.

- **New Capabilities and Partnerships.** The Alliance has an interest in protecting global lifelines that sustain modern societies and in promoting security and stability well beyond its immediate borders. That mission will in all likelihood be carried out in cooperation with its partners. Even though NATO's military tools are not always perfectly suited to address such challenges, Article 4 can provide a vital mechanism for identifying areas of common concern, devising an appropriate response, and coordinating NATO actions with partner organisations and states. To this end, the Alliance must further improve its crisis management capabilities, including the capacity to identify and to assess emerging risks, reassure member states, and undertake crisis response operations within, along, or beyond its borders. The Strategic Concept should authorize and encourage the Secretary General to move ahead with a farreaching agenda of administrative and other reforms aimed at producing an Alliance that is leaner, better able to make timely decisions, and more efficient and cost-effective. Compared to its first decades, NATO in the near future is likely to appear less often on the centre stage of global affairs. Instead, it will be cast in a variety of roles, sometimes as a leader, at other times in a supporting capacity sharing the spotlight with partners and friends. All the while, it will need to keep a wary eye on dangers that could arise close to home, while maintaining a farsighted focus on how to respond to perils that might emerge at distant locations. Alliance success depends on the equitable sharing among members of roles, risks and

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responsibilities, as well as benefits. NATO will make full use of its links to other countries and organisations to help prevent and mitigate crises as some new capabilities may be needed. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) provide the framework for NATO's cooperation with partners in Europe and Eurasia. Regarding the new threads, i.e. terrorism, the Defence Against Terrorism Programme is playing a vital role. Effective cyber defence requires the means to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks. NATO has taken steps to develop these capabilities through creation of a Cyber Defence Management Authority, a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and a Computer Incident Response Capability. Nonetheless, there persist serious gaps in NATO's cyber defence capabilities. The Strategic Concept should place a high priority on addressing these vulnerabilities. A new level of secure maritime situational awareness is called for by changing risks around the periphery of NATO and in the High North, Gulf, Indian Ocean and other areas. C4ISR as NATO's operational glue provide the operational sinew binding NATO and national forces together into an interoperable, agile, and cohesive whole. Allies and partners should emphasise investment in national systems at the tactical and operational levels that will tie into NATO's strategic-operational networks. Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities (NATO Special Operations Headquarters) are developing common training and doctrine as well as enhancing intelligence sharing.

Full complementarity between NATO and the EU, as between the two main security pillars in the region, will be essential if the Allies are to forge a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to security when both are involved in a stabilisation mission. The EU will often have more relevant expertise than NATO in countering the non-military aspects of such dangers, even though the line between military and non-military threats is becoming blurred. It should be noted, however, that full complementarity is only possible if non-EU NATO members and non-NATO EU members are accorded the same degree of transparency and involvement when joint activities are conducted. In its contacts with the EU, NATO leaders should avoid the trap of categorising all threats and responsibilities as distinctly "military" or "non-military." Instead, they should nurture the habit of thinking of these issues as developing along a continuum. Many situations will require a response that includes both forceful and non-coercive elements; NATO, the EU, and others should bring to bear the capabilities that add the most value in finding a solution. Accordingly, NATO should seek to agree with EU leaders on a plan for regular joint participation in meetings, fuller communications between military staffs, and more extensive coordination with respect to crisis management, threat assessments, and sharing assets.

The NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a means for fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic region; the Alliance remains dedicated to that goal. The principal forum for communication through the Alliance has been the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). This venue -- which has not always been adequately employed – was designed to provide the means for preventing crises, analyzing events, broaching ideas, and agreeing on joint actions to deal with mutual concerns. Although the Alliance neither poses a military threat to Russia, nor considers Russia a military threat to the Alliance, doubts persist on both sides about the intentions and policies of the other. Consistent with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the new Strategic Concept should reaffirm NATO's desire to help build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order which includes security cooperation with Russia. To this end, the Alliance should demonstrate its commitment to the NRC (and invite Russia to do the same) by focusing on opportunities for pragmatic collaboration in pursuit of such shared interests as nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, counter-terrorism, missile defence, effective crisis management, peace operations, maritime security, and the fight against trafficking in illegal drugs.

- **Regulation of the PMCs.** PMCs only represent one of the three broad types of Military Service Providers(MSPs) but the type of most concern for regulation. PMCs are companies that generally work for states or international organizations and provide military services designed to significantly impact strategic situations. We cannot speak for any other body but NATO. In fact the majority of fears articulated by critics exist only as academic theory. Most regulations having to do with human rights and accountability will be readily accepted by the PMCs who already assume standards instilled in typical Western militariest(i.e. the IPOA Code of Conduct articulating some key human rights protections was largely written by NGOs and widely endorsed by PMCs). Given that PMCs are the best and only realistic hope for effective military support of peace operations in most developing countries, regulations should not impinge on the speed and flexibility of their use for such tasks. Working as "force multipliers" PMCs can provide the competent military backbone to ensure the success of UN or regional multinational peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. PMCs can *proactively* make peace, end the killing and maintain order while allowing international bodies to negotiate permanent settlements.

We think that contractual obligations can be much more specific and invasive than general guidelines and regulations as they can include military observers, increased transparency and detailed financial and legal penalties for noncompliance. Regulation with no benefit to the companies could be only counterproductive as companies could try to evade it. NATO appreciates the very difficult and dangerous work they do with us(i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq) and from a NATO point of view we have had no problems of which we would be aware with regard to the conduct of private military companies. We do watch carefully what is done, but we have had a good experience until now.

- As Allies prepare a new Strategic Concept, they bear in mind how such a document will be read not only within the Euro-Atlantic community but

in every region. NATO populations should be reminded that the Alliance serves their interests through the security it provides; people outside NATO should know that the organisation and its partners are working each day to build a safer world. Looking to the future, we know that global and regional risks must naturally command NATO's attention. The Allied leaders have learned that their Alliance must constantly adapt to the demands of political and technological change, but they have also learned what must not change. NATO's Strategic Concept must begin and end with NATO's founding ideals.

Yours respectfully,

Silvia Répássyová

i "New Challenges - Better Capabilities"; Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Bratislava Security Conference; Oct 22nd, 2009
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_58248.htm?selectedLocale=en